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Why The TREP Was Suspended

Why The TREP Was Suspended
(Versión en español)
I've been reviewing public documents in an attempt to figure out exactly what happened on Election Day (October 20th 2019) in Bolivia to cause the stoppage of the TREP (non-binding preliminary vote count). This unexpected stoppage, followed by a late rally that expanded the MAS's lead just enough to win outright in the first round, led to accusations of electoral fraud that fueled a protest movement which eventually overthrew the government.
I think the suspension of the TREP was a result of the tension and lack of communication between Marcel Guzmán de Rojas, the director of NEOTEC, the firm which developed and administered the computer system that processed the votes, and Ethical Hacking, the Panamanian cybersecurity firm that was hired in the last few weeks by the TSE (Supreme Electoral Court, which oversees Bolivian elections) to audit the system then monitor it on Election Day. It's important to note that some MAS-aligned members of the TSE had hoped to develop their own system instead of continuing to rely on NEOTEC, who'd administered elections in Bolivia for decades, but their effort failed and NEOTEC, who had the support of the MAS's opposition, was rehired about five weeks before the election. The TSE reached out to Ethical Hacking about a week later on September 19th. It wouldn't be until October 4th, though, just 16 days before the election, when the first meeting between NEOTEC and Ethical Hacking was held, and the compressed pre-election schedule contributed to frictions between them. Guzmán de Rojas felt burdened by the additional demands on him, and the monitoring software that's so often mentioned in news reports was installed over the protests of Guzmán de Rojas, who expressed skepticism about it, fearing it could create conflicts with his own software and there wasn't enough time to test it adequately. When it was finally installed on his servers three days before the election, he only agreed because the TSE ordered it, and even then he had a contract drawn up in which he repeated his concerns, and he and Ethical Hacking's CEO Alvaro Andrade bickered over the details.
The day before Election Day, there was an event with government officials and electoral observers in which they reinitialized the databases, validated the election software, and preserved a copy of the source code, then had a verbal agreement not to make more changes or connect to the servers. However, shortly before midnight Guzmán de Rojas accessed one of the servers, which generated security alerts. Ethical Hacking called Guzmán de Rojas, who explained that in the earlier event, there wasn't enough time to reinitialize all the databases and he'd planned to finish the process later. Ethical Hacking asked him to disconnect from the server and not make any more changes, but hours later, early in the morning on Election Day, Guzmán de Rojas made two bugfixes to his code in response to errors caused by the arrival of the first tally sheets from overseas, which generated more security alerts and forced Ethical Hacking to redo its review from the day before. According to Ethical Hacking, these unauthorized changes "generated great suspicion and unease toward NEOTEC among the TSE board" and Guzmán de Rojas was forced to agree in writing to not make any more changes without the coordination and participation of the DNTIC (National IT Directorate) and Ethical Hacking. Also, throughout Election Day, Guzmán de Rojas and his staff regularly accessed the servers to check the logs despite the protests of the cybersecurity people, who preferred that it be done via their monitoring software. Reading the Ethical Hacking report, one gets the sense that Guzmán de Rojas saw them as a nuisance that could mostly be ignored as he went about his usual work. In fact, this was the first time that the TSE had hired a cybersecurity firm to monitor an election and Guzmán de Rojas must not have been used to such strict supervision. When he saw something that needed to be done, he sometimes did it without bothering with whatever protocols there might be.
The most serious problems emerged in the lead-up to the 7:45PM press conference at which the TSE board would announce the preliminary results. To facilitate this event, there was a planned stoppage of the generation of TREP results at 7:40PM, so that during the press conference, these results wouldn't change mid-announcement. However, also around this time, there was a large, unexpected increase in tally sheet verification traffic coming an unauthorized server known as bo1. This was the first of the so-called hidden servers, both of which were used to relay routine traffic to the servers that warehoused the electoral data, but it's important to note that, according to the OAS, this server had been active all day relaying tally sheet verification traffic from the SERECI (Civil Registry Service). Ethical Hacking should've sent a notification about this server earlier, since it wasn't in the list provided to them that morning by Guzmán de Rojas, but failed to do so.
When the number of HTTP requests from bo1 increased, an event which began around 7:30PM, 10 minutes after the peak of tally sheet verifications, this activity was flagged by Ethical Hacking, who saw that the traffic was for tally sheet verifications and it was coming from an unauthorized IP address. They tried to call Guzmán de Rojas - who was working at the SERECI offices where the tally sheets were being verified, instead of with Ethical Hacking at the TSE offices - but couldn't reach him. They also consulted the DNTIC about the server, but they didn't recognize it. After two failed attempts to contact Guzmán de Rojas, they sounded a "maximum alert" to the TSE. Guzmán de Rojas says that at around 8:10 PM the utilities at the SERECI offices were cut, which put a stop to tally sheet verifications. Minutes later at 8:15 PM, he received a call from the TSE in which he was ordered to halt the TREP and to come to an urgent meeting at the TSE offices.
It's worth stopping for a moment to consider the explanation Guzmán de Rojas later gave of this unauthorized bo1 server:
(Note: Transmission operators are functionaries present at polling places who use an Android app developed by NEOTEC to transcribe each tally sheet and take a photo of it, sending this data to a cloud server operated by NEOTEC so that it can then be validated by the verification operators at the SERECI who independently transcribe the photo of the tally sheet.)
The bo1 server, a perimeter server (Nginx gateway), was used during the preparations for the election from 9/20/2019 onward. This server was used for the registration of transmission operators and verification operators, the training of verification operators, and during the testing of the transmission of results and the verification of tally sheets prior to the election.
The agent monitor ossec wasn't installed on this server. The server bo21 should've been used on Election Day, an instruction which wasn't carried out.
In his reports, he's vague about the reason for the error, only saying he should've used another server but failed to do so. In their report, Ethical Hacking describe how they performed an extensive security review of this server shortly after the stoppage, reviewing all its logs and checking for any malicious software, and found nothing to contradict Guzmán de Rojas. It really does seem that it was just some test server that was active when it shouldn't have been. Also, he showed the others that this server was where he stored historical data from previous elections, which would seem to support his claim about it being a test server.
What's absolutely clear is that the TSE wasn't in on this at all. Around 8:30PM, everyone meets at the TSE offices and, according to Ethical Hacking, an extremely tense scene ensues:
By this time, the president of the TSE and the board members, except for Dr. Costas, started to accuse Marcel Guzmán de Rojas of committing fraud. The situation became untenable. Everyone started shouting and accusing him of fraud. There was talk of calling the Attorney General, of calling the police. We had to intervene to calm the mood of the meeting.
Again, it simply does not make sense that the TSE was behind this server. What happened clearly took them by surprise and they were extremely hostile toward Guzmán de Rojas. This detail is not in any report, but a friend told me that he'd spoken to an ex-minister from the MAS who suspected Guzmán de Rojas had sabotaged the election, which seems unlikely but does help illustrate just how much the MAS distrusts him.
According to Guzmán de Rojas, the TSE presented him with three reasons at the 8:30PM meeting to justify their stoppage of the TREP:
1: The use of an unmonitored server, bo1.
2: The unexpected increase in tally sheet verification traffic from the bo1 server.
3: The sudden change in trend between the MAS and CC.
You can tell right away from the first two reasons that the inciting event of this entire catastrophe was the maximum alert about bo1. That's why they stopped the TREP. Because they thought the computer system was being manipulated. In fact, Ethical Hacking says that at the 8:30PM meeting it was again ordered that the TREP be stopped "until what happened can be verified" and it's clear this is a reference to the bo1 server. However, the TSE was alerted about more than just that server. Ethical Hacking also notified the TSE about cyberattacks from Colombia. Here's how the board member Edgar Gonzalez described it:
Regarding the bo1 server, Gonzáles claimed that it was the audit firm Ethical Hacking that pointed out that error, for which the whole board was called to a meeting where the board member Antonio Costas wasn't present. That meeting was between 8:30PM and 9:00PM on Election Day.
González explained that Marcel Guzmán de Rojas didn't declare that server and, "second of all, at that time the system was receiving a ton of attacks. That's what the IT person from the audit firm explained (to us). Something like 70,000 attacks from Colombia," the TSE board member specified in statements to Urgente.bo.
"That's what they told us, that the server was being attacked from overseas. Mr. Guzmán de Rojas (told us) that there was another server, an IP address that he hadn't declared and he apologized," he noted.
In Ethical Hacking's report, there's a section about this event, which they describe as a possible denial of service attack. According to a 6:58 PM email in their report, the public TREP results website had received over a million HTTP requests in less than an hour from a single IP address. Using a simple whois, I found that the IP address belongs to Centro Nacional de Consultoria in Bogotá, Colombia. Based on their website, they're a firm that does market research and corporate consulting, but most importantly they are a parent company of ViaCiencia, one of the principal polling firms for the election and the only one certified by the government to perform a quick count on Election Day. All their requests were for resources of the form https://trep.oep.org.bo/resul/resulActa/xxxxx/yy, which are JSON-formatted TREP vote counts. For example, if I wanted TREP vote counts for the presidential election (1) from tally sheet #71795, I'd request:
(Note: The website was deactivated in January 2020.)
It's clear from this and the large number of requests being generated that they were only scraping the TREP election results website, but there's a thin line between scraping and a denial of service attack, and these folks in Bogotá crossed it. The obvious solution to a single IP address drowning you in requests is to block it, but it's not clear that this happened. Ethical Hacking had no credentials to log in to the servers - only the notifications from their monitoring software - and may have had trouble reaching the person who did have the logins: Guzmán de Rojas. According to Edgar Gonzalez, word about this supposed cyberattack reached him as part of the alert about bo1, which helped set off a panic that resulted in the suspension of the TREP.
In his October 28th report, Guzmán de Rojas admits he shouldn't have used the bo1 server for the election, but insists the traffic level was absolutely normal. Ethical Hacking disagrees, claiming it's impossible for legitimate SERECI tally sheet verification traffic to reach "30,000 HTTP requests every 30 seconds," a figure taken from this traffic graph in their report:
Warning: The times in this graph are all one hour early, which is because Ethical Hacking is based in Panama. Also, you can see that Ethical Hacking's '30,000 requests per 30s' is actually 30,000 requests *per 5 minutes* (=3,000 per 30s).
This question of what constitutes normal traffic seems like the only point where Guzmán de Rojas and Ethical Hacking are in serious conflict about the facts. I'm inclined to trust Guzmán de Rojas here since it's his system and Ethical Hacking only had two weeks of experience with it. (Click here for a discussion of the bo1 traffic spike.)
At the end of Guzmán de Rojas's claim that the traffic was normal, he makes this comment:
If the use of the bo1 server and an increase in traffic were considered anomalies, this should've been warned about and cleared up before 7:30PM.
And he's right! Ethical Hacking should've flagged traffic from bo1 much earlier. You can see in their owb graph that bo1, the green line, had been active long before the labeled spike. In fact, the OAS says it had been active all day. It's possible Ethical Hacking didn't pay attention to it because, like the authorized servers, it had an IP address in a range reserved for private networks (format: 10.x.x.x), which really ought to have given them more pause about sending a maximum alert.
That traffic graph can be combined with other evidence to reconstruct some of the timeline of the TREP stoppage. The number of HTTP requests from bo1 began to spike at around 7:30PM Bolivia time. In their report, Ethical Hacking claims to have detected the traffic increase right at 7:30PM, but they may not have actually noticed until some minutes later, since the traffic level then was about equal with the previous peak. They called Guzmán de Rojas twice without success and consulted with the DNTIC, after which they sent their maximum alert to the TSE. I believe the TSE only learned about this alert between 7:53-7:58PM. I say this because from 7:50-7:53PM there was the TSE's preliminary results press conference, which was attended by all the board members, and none appear to be alarmed or hurried. The TSE president, María Eugenia Choque, even ends the event noting that there were still many rural votes to be counted, which would seem to imply she believed the TREP would continue. The latest the TSE would've learned about this alert was 7:58PM, which corresponds to the apparent first attempt to cut the SERECI's internet. This can be seen in unreleased electoral data which shows a 5-second pause followed by a change in the SERECI's IP address at 7:58:07PM, which appears to be their backup line. Then, at 8:06:44PM, their first IP address was restored and seconds later at 8:07PM, all tally sheet verifications ceased, so the utilities must've been cut. After this, according to Guzmán de Rojas, the TSE board (minus Costas) called him around 8:15PM and ordered him to halt the TREP.
If you'll recall, there was a third reason given to Guzmán de Rojas for the TREP suspension: a sudden change in trend between the MAS and CC. And for all the media coverage this reason has received, you'd think that it was the only one. It's taken for granted that the TSE had no real complaint except that the result appeared unfavorable for the MAS, but there's reason to believe there really was an apparent sudden change in trend. In particular, in this interview (and this one) Álvaro Andrade of Ethical Hacking says that in the lead-up to the press conference, there was a sharp reduction in the MAS's margin of victory over CC, which abruptly declined from 11-12 points to seven points, and that this prompted a request from the TSE to verify these numbers. Andrade explained way the decline by citing the verification of tally sheets from Santa Cruz, whose voters tend to oppose the MAS, but the problem with all of this is that, based on the public data, at no point did the MAS ever have an 11-12 point lead in the presidential election. It's not clear what occurred, but one striking detail that could explain it comes from the November 4th NEOTEC report, in which Guzmán de Rojas explains that the TREP system was set up to serially replicate election data from a primary server to a secondary server, then from this secondary server to a tertiary server, after which this tertiary server would serve as the data source for the TREP website. However, around 7:00 PM on Election Night the data replication process across these servers was unexpectedly slow, with the result that the tertiary server had a dataset that was, at most, about half the size of that of the first server. To ensure the press conference was held with the more complete data set, Guzmán de Rojas says he reconfigured the website to instead reference the first server, whose dataset was at least twice as large as the others'. It's possible that the phantom 11-12 point lead reflected an incomplete data set on the tertiary server, and that when the switch was made to the first server, this gave the appearance of a sudden change in trend. In his October 28th report, Guzmán de Rojas argued there was no change in trend, which he later interpreted as a lead change between the two parties, but it appears only to have been a question of whether the MAS would win outright in the first round. At the 8:30PM meeting, he tried to clear up the TSE board's concerns, but they weren't convinced and decided not to resume the TREP.
Also, in the OAS report, a shadowy figure appears at this time. A advisor who's not on any employee lists but is vouched for by the TSE. They withheld his name in the OAS report, but Alvaro Andrade later named him in an interview. This advisor is one Sergio Martínez. According to his LinkedIn profile, he'd recently done IT work at the National Institute of Statistics and had worked other government jobs prior. He began work as an IT contractor for the SERECI on October 8th, only four days after Ethical Hacking's own start. He appears in passing multiple times in the Ethical Hacking report, always in routine professional contexts: in two emails about security patches and audits on the 15th and in another from the 18th after he provided Andrade with a protocol to reinitialize the databases. He was also present for meetings after the TREP interruption on Election Night, where he appears to have proposed the configuration of a new perimeter server - bo20, the second of the hidden servers - that would be used for the verification of the remaining tally sheets, likely to resolve the conflict between Marcel Guzmán de Rojas and the TSE board, some of whom distrusted Marcel and had accused him of fraud. In a report provided to the OAS, the DNTIC said that this bo20 server was configured a day later by all of the important technical personnel: the DNTIC, NEOTEC, and Ethical Hacking (SIM SRL).
In his November 4th report to the TSE, Guzmán de Rojas offers this description of bo20:
On election night at the 20:00 (sic) meeting, the TSE decided to replace the bo1 server with a new server, bo20. This server was created and configured in the TSE's Amazon AWS server space. Just like the server bo1, the new server is a simple gateway, a reverse proxy using Nginx.
It's clear from statements he's made that he thought the TSE's complaints about bo1 and the excessive traffic were baseless, but there was no way of placating them except with another gateway server that was, as he explained, just like the one it was replacing.
The next day, according to NEOTEC's October 28th report, there was a meeting at 12:30PM between Guzmán de Rojas and the TSE where they all hashed out how to proceed. It was there that it was decided that the internet would be restored to the SERECI offices, the remaining TREP tally sheets would be processed, and then the publication of results would resume once this was completed. Also, a new IP address, this one belonging to the new bo20 server, was given to the SERECI by the DNTIC director for the verification of the remaining actas. Around 2:30PM, the SERECI had its internet restored and their TREP operators began to process tally sheets again. It would be another four hours, at 6:30PM, before the order was given to resume the publication of results, which resulted in a sharp discontinuity when the public website updated for the first time in nearly a day. In that time, 3831 tally sheets were verified and the MAS's margin over CC had grown from 7.87% to 10.15%, pushing it just over the critical 10% margin needed to win outright in the first round.
The rest of the story is less interesting, although some errors and bad practices are shocking for a production system in a national election. It all occurs in the Cómputo (official vote count) and it's scene after scene in which, say, there's a correction requested by an electoral official or a database error, so the DNTIC grants Marcel VPN access and he fixes the mistake in the only way he can: with a SQL command, as I'm sure he's done a million times in a million other elections. In most cases he appears to have permission from government officials, but he's not observed performing the changes. He simply does it, then documents in an email the SQL command he used, and then Ethical Hacking complains that he's not following procedure. There's also a WhatsApp chat log at the end of the Ethical Hacking report that shows there was an informal system between Windsor Saire, the director of the DNTIC, and Marcel Guzmán de Rojas which the two tried to document via email but which didn't appear to include the in-person supervision of Marcel.
(Note: There have been many complaints about the use of these SQL commands, which is terrible practice and even worse within the context of an election, but according to the contract Guzmán de Rojas had drawn up, the database (MySQL) history files on the TREP servers were being monitored in real time. After that second bug fix in the morning on Election Day, he said, 'With the bash (Linux command line) and MySQL history files, you can see what I did.' I'd expect Ethical Hacking to have monitored the same logs on the Cómputo servers, although it's unclear to me if this is the case. At any rate, if Guzmán de Rojas's emails are accurate, these SQL commands were all corrections of erroneous status values, not edits to vote totals.)
I'm confident there wasn't any data manipulation during the outage, and I think the belief that there was is due to the enormity of the technical fuck-ups and the bitterness of the political divisions in the country. Why? Because the final margin is predictable based on pre-interruption trends. Also, the OAS hasn't pointed to discrepancies between the digital and physical records, which for me would constitute strong evidence of data manipulation.
  • Fragment from Ethical Hacking Report to TSE (10/28/2019, link)
  • NEOTEC Report to TSE #1 (10/28/2019, link)
  • NEOTEC Report to TSE #2 (11/4/2019, link)
  • Ethical Hacking Consolidated Timeline (v1.4, 11/6/2019, link)
  • OAS Preliminary Report (11/10/2019, link)
  • DNTIC Report to OAS about bo20 (11/11/2019, link)
  • OAS Final Report (12/4/2019, link)
  • Statement from Sergio Martínez (12/10/2019, link)
UPDATE #1: I wrote to Guzmán de Rojas to explain why I disagreed with the OAS report and to urge him to rebut it. To my great surprise, he responded.
UPDATE #2: Ex-TSE vice president Antonio Costas, who voted against certifying Evo Morales's candidacy and was the only board member with an IT background, points to human error as well. Some choice quotes from this October 23rd article:
"I get word that my colleagues (board members) were meeting with [Ethical Hacking] and NEOTEC. What happened is that there's a security protocol between the two firms and a part of the data was migrated in order to publish the data to another server, a movement which needed to be coordinated. [Ethical Hacking] detects this situation, and I think in this there was an excessively zealous protocol. Instead of making a big fuss, they should've sat down and looked at what happened. (...) They should've warned us," he said in an interview with Unitel.
"There's no fraud here. It was incompetence," he said.
(Other interviews: CNN, La Revista al Día, PAT, NTN, RED+. There's this, too, from 11 days before the election. Costas says that Ethical Hacking was "very demanding", but that they were helping to formalize processes that were somewhat improvisational and this would ultimately improve the TSE as an institution.)
UPDATE #3: The EU also published a report with a few interesting details. They explain that the TSE's original plan with the TREP was to make a single announcement at 8:00PM to avoid confusion with the official count, which they had done in prior elections, but 10 days before the election, under outside pressure, they agreed to two more announcements, one at midnight and another later on the 21st. It seems that, with the decision to suspend the TREP, the TSE tried to fall back to their original plan and in effect wash their hands of the TREP right there, but ultimately gave in to calls to resume it. Also, in the lead-up to the election, there were many dismissals and resignations of key TSE staff, which reduced its technical expertise for the election. It's possible this made the TSE more dependent on its contractors to perform the technical roles.
UPDATE #4: I obtained new electoral data and used it to make a timeline (in Spanish) of the progression of the TREP during the period when the publication of results was halted. The exact time of the interruption was 8:07 PM, at which point the MAS had a 9.02% lead with 95.06% of tally sheets transmitted and 89.98% verified in the presidential race.
UPDATE #5: I missed this uncharacteristically informative November 18th piece from Página Siete where Guzmán de Rojas and Andrade snipe at each other. Guzmán de Rojas denies BO1 was an unknown server, insisting it had been used in testing two days before the election and Andrade should've complained then. He also claims Andrade's erroneous "30,000 HTTP requests per 30 seconds" is a deliberate lie. For his part, Andrade says all the errors were the fault of Guzmán de Rojas, who violated the security protocol over and over. One odd detail is Andrade claims to have received a notification about BO1 at 6:49 (PM). This seems an hour too soon, so I assume he's citing it for the wrong time zone and actually means 7:49 PM, but I'm not sure.
UPDATE #6: A point which needs to be underlined is that NEOTEC (read: Guzmán de Rojas) was the only one with access to the TREP servers. Not even the government had logins. This point has been made by everyone. The TSE board said it. Alvaro Andrade said it. In fact, Guzmán de Rojas first appears in Andrade's report refusing to give him logins. It was the first item in that contract of his, too. DNTIC director Windsor Saire said it. Even Sergio Martinez said it. Any theory of data manipulation that doesn't centrally involve Guzmán de Rojas - who had a long track record, the support of the opposition, and was viewed skeptically by the MAS - is questionable.
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FAQ: The VeChainThor Blockchain Token Swap

Note: the last update to this post was made on July 10, 2018.
While the VeChainThor Blockchain is packed with new features and technological innovation facilitating mass enterprise adoption, it leverages some components of Ethereum such as EVM, P2P communication, and address structure. Same as Ethereum, a VeChainThor Address contains 42 characters and starts with 0x.
This article is designed to help you how to differentiate the VeChainThor Addresses and Ethereum addresses as well as the precautions you should take during the token swap to avoid any mistake. We will continuously update the community during the entire token swap process to reflect the latest information.

Rule of thumb:

NEVER transfer ETH or any ERC20 token (including ERC20 VEN) from an Ethereum wallet (such as MEW, imToken) to a VeChainThor Address, and vice versa. Even though the address format is similar, Ethereum and the VeChainThor Blockchain are separate blockchains.


1. How do I tell if my address is an VeChainThor Address or Ethereum address?
A VeChainThor Addresses can be created and managed in the wallets that support the VeChainThor Mainnet (see the list compatible wallets below)
2. I use MEW (Myetherwallet) to store my ERC20 VEN, and it shows ERC20 VEN as VET and the address looks similar. Is this VET token?
NO. MEW only supports tokens on the Ethereum blockchain. ERC20 VEN shows as VET because MEW follows the naming convention after the VeChain rebrand. In short, MEW can only be used to store and process ERC20 VEN, after the token swap VET is no longer compatible with MEW. You need to make sure you only send VET to the addresses created in your VeChainThor wallet.
3. When will the exchange start the token swap? How do I know if my tokens have been swapped for VETs on the exchange?
VeChain team has been actively working with the exchanges to integrate VeChainThor mainnet, while the exchanges determine the actual token swap date. Please pay attention to the announcement of the exchange that your ERC20 VEN is stored. We will also update the token swap date in this FAQ as soon as we are aware of the announcement.
On the token swap date, the exchange will swap your ERC20 VEN tokens for VET tokens at a 1:100 ratio, which means you will be able to see balance in the asset of VET as a new asset class. Otherwise, you should wait for the token swap to be complete before withdrawing the VET to the VeChainThor wallet. Please pay attention to the asset name.
Please see below table for the latest token swap date and asset names.
4. I want to send my ERC20 VEN tokens to exchange for token swap, how do I know I’m using the correct deposit address?
Even if the ERC20 VEN trading is not available, exchanges will likely still support ERC20 VEN token deposit during the token swap process. Before you send the ERC20 VEN tokens, double check the name of the asset for the deposit address and make sure it is for the ERC20 VEN token. You can only use Ethereum wallets such as MEW and imToken to send your ERC20 VEN token to the deposit address.
The VET token deposit will be made available by the exchange after the token swap starts. If you would like to deposit VETs, double check the name of the asset for the deposit address and make sure it is for the VET token. You can only use the VeChainThor Wallet to send your VET token to the deposit address.
See the list of exchanges that announced support for the VeChainThor Token Swap.
5. Do I have to do anything for the token swap if my ERC20 VEN is sitting in the exchange?
As long as the exchange supports the VeChainThor Mainnet integration and token swap, you do not need to do anything. The exchanges will swap your ERC20 VEN to VET at a 1:100 ratio.
See the list of exchanges that announced support for the VeChainThor Token Swap.
6. I'm an X Node holder and would like to use exchanges for token swap so that I get VETs sooner. Do I have to keep at least 0.01 VEN in my X Node address on Ethereum in order to complete the X Node binding in the VeChainThor Mobile Wallet?
YES, during the X Node binding process, you need to prove the ownership of your X Node address on Ethereum. To do that, you have to send 0.01 VEN from your X Node address on Ethereum to the intermediary address (Ethereum address) unique to you during the binding process. Therefore, you should keep 0.01 VEN on your X Node address on Ethereum andd send the rest of the VEN to the exchange for token swap.
7. My ERC20 VEN has been successfully swapped for VET on the exchange, so I would like to withdraw the VET to my VeChainThor Wallet. How do I tell if I’m using the correct withdraw address?
First, you need to double check the name of the asset for the deposit address and make sure it is for the VET token. Secondly, only input the address created in the VeChainThor Wallet to withdraw the VET to make sure you can successfully receive the token.
8. I just transferred VET/VTHO, is there any explorer I can check the transactions and account balances on the VeChainThor Blockchain? Can I use etherscan?
The VeChainThor Blockchain and Ethereum are separate blockchains; you will not be able to check transaction or account balance of VET/VTHO on etherscan. You should only use explorers that support the VeChainThor mainnet to check the transaction and account balances on the VeChainThor Blockchain. (see the list of compatible explorers below)
9. When I use the X Node binding and token swap services, what are the ERC20 VEN address and intermediary address? Can I send VET tokens to these addresses?
NO, both addresses are Ethereum addresses, not VeChainThor Addresses, so you MUST NOT send any VET token to these addresses.
ERC20 VEN address is the address which stores your ERC20 VEN tokens on Ethereum.
The intermediary address is a unique address cryptographically generated for you. All intermediary addresses start with 0x and followed by 20 0s so that no one is able to move the funds further. Your intermediary address can only be generated during your X Node binding or token swap services.
10. I’m an X Node holder, after I bound my X Node, I sent the rest of my ERC20 VEN to the intermediary address by mistake. What should I do?
To repeat, during this process of X Node binding, the intermediary address is only used to receive your 0.01 ERC20 VEN to bind your X Node. After successfully bound your X Node, you MUST NOT transfer the rest of your ERC20 to this intermediary address.
In the worst case scenario you transferred ERC20 VEN to the intermediary address by mistake, please contact [email protected]chain.com and seek assistance. Once the X Node binding process is completed, we will manually handle your case and send you the corresponding amount of VET to the bound VeChainThor Address. Please be patient as this is a manual process and will be completed as technicians have available time.
11. How long do I have to wait after I send 0.01 VEN to the intermediary address for address binding?
The binding usually takes about 20 minutes to complete. We confirm your binding status after 50 blocks on the Ethereum blockchain once we detect the valid transaction in the intermediary address. However, it could take longer if the Ethereum network is in congestion. If your node binding is still not confirmed 30 minutes after you see the transaction in the intermediary address, please contact [email protected] for troubleshooting.
12. How long do I have to wait before I receive my VETs in the VeChainThor Address when I use the token swap service in the VeChainThor Mobile Wallet?
When the token swap service is available in the VeChainThor Mobile Wallet, you should first bind your ERC20 VEN address, intermediary address and VeChainThor Address by sending 0.01 VEN to your intermediary address. This binding process should take about 20 minutes (same as X Node binding). This step allows us to offer further troubleshooting and security steps for you the user.
After that, you can send as many VEN tokens as you want to the dedicated intermediary address. It usually would take about 6-12 hours before you receive the corresponding amount of VET in your VeChainThor Wallet. Depending on your time zone it could take as long as 24 hours. This process is done semi-automatically as the Foundation and third party needs to check everything before releasing the funds manually. If you do not receive VET in the VeChainThor Wallet 24 hours after you perform the swap, please contact [email protected] for troubleshooting.
13. If I sent my ERC20 VEN tokens to the VeChainThor Address, is it possible to recover it?
Potentially, but we highly recommend you make sure you are using the correct address before conducting any transaction. Resorting to seeking further help should be your last option as there is a risk that recovery might not be successful. You should follow the steps below for recovery:
  • Export the keystore of the VeChainThor Address from the VeChainThor Wallet
  • Import the keystore file into an Ethereum wallet (such as MEW and imToken), you will be asked to input the password of the keystore. It is same as the wallet password you set in the VeChainThor Wallet
  • If it is imported successfully, you will be able to restore this address in the Ethereum wallet and gain control over the ERC20 VEN token.
Please note the mnemonic phrase can not be used for recovery due to the different coin type between the VeChainThor Blockchain and Ethereum.

General Information

Wallets that support the VeChainThor Mainnet:
  • Official mobile wallets - iOS Android
  • Sync - the user agent of the VeChainThor Blockchain on Mac and Windows
Explorers that support the VeChainThor Mainnet:
  • Veforge.com (by Totient Labs)
  • VeScan.io (by the community)
  • Sync - the user agent of the VeChainThor Blockchain on Mac and Windows
Exchanges that announced supporting VeChainThor mainnet token swap, and here is a summary of the latest status. (all the times below are UTC+8)
  • Due to the token split (1 VEN = 100 VET) the unit trading price of VEN and VET might be significantly different, please pay extra attention to the name of the asset before you trade it.
Exchange ERC20 VEN Trading? VET Trading? Token Swap Date ERC20 VEN withdraw VET Deposit VET Withdraw
LBank Yes July 13 July 13 No July 13 July 13
Binance Yes TBA TBA Yes TBA TBA
Huobi.pro Yes TBA TBA Yes TBA TBA
Bithumb Yes TBA TBA Yes TBA TBA
Bitfinex Yes TBA TBA Yes TBA TBA
CoinSpot Yes TBA TBA Yes TBA TBA
DragonEx Yes TBA TBA Yes TBA TBA
Kucoin Yes TBA TBA Yes TBA TBA
For the most updated information regarding VET token swap, please follow:
Please email [email protected] if you need any support.
submitted by VeChain-Foundation to Vechain

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